Former military Head of State, Gen. Yakubu Gowon (rtd.), has stated that several northern military officers believed the late Dim Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was complicit in the January 1966 coup and were prepared to move against him in the tense aftermath of Nigeria’s first military takeover.
This revelation is contained in Gowon’s memoir, “My Life of Duty and Allegiance”, which was presented in Abuja, Tuesday.
The book, published by the Havilah Group Lagos.
The former Head of State revisited one of the most turbulent periods in Nigeria’s history, the January 1966 coup, which was carried out by a group of young military officers, most of whom were of Igbo origin.
The coup claimed the lives of some of the country’s most influential political and military leaders, especially from Northern Nigeria.
Among those killed were then Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello; the Premier of the Western Region, Samuel Ladoke Akintola; and Finance Minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh.
The coup also led to the death of Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, regarded at the time as the most senior northern military officer, alongside many other northern soldiers.
Although the coup ultimately failed, it dramatically altered Nigeria’s political trajectory.
Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was then the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), emerged as the Head of State, to restore normalcy.
However, the tensions and suspicions generated by the failed putsch triggered the July 1966 counter-coup, during which Aguiyi-Ironsi was assassinated along with his host, the Governor of Western Region, who was his host.
After the counter-coup largely led by northern military officers, Gowon, then a Lieutenant Colonel and COAS, emerged as the new Head of State.
But his emergence immediately sparked resistance from Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, who was then Military Governor of the defunct Eastern Region.
According to Gowon, Ojukwu insisted that Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, who was senior to him in military hierarchy, should have succeeded Ironsi instead.
At the time Gowon assumed office, he was junior to several officers, including Ogundipe, Commodore Joseph Wey and Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo.
Gowon would later be promoted rapidly to wear the rank of Major-General and subsequently to a full General within the span of one year.
Reflecting on the circumstances surrounding the non-elevation of Ogundipe, Gowon wrote in his book that the Brigadier could no longer effectively function within the command structure of the military after the coup crisis, a move that offended the Yoruba officers.
“The case of Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe was, however, not as straightforward because the course of the coup had made it obvious that he could no longer function effectively in the command-and-control structure of the Nigerian Army and the Armed Forces.
“With the concurrence of the UK government, he was appointed Nigeria’s High Commissioner to the UK,” Gowon stated.
The former Head of State said the events following the coup made Ojukwu reject his overtures for friendship and therefore, refused to recognise his authority.
“Ojukwu refused my offer of friendship. By extension, he wilfully refused to recognise my leadership.
“He felt that the ‘normal’ protocol of seniority in service should have been upheld in selecting General Ironsi’s successor under the new administration, regardless of the circumstances by which I assumed power,” Gowon wrote.
He explained that Commodore Wey played a key role in persuading members of the then Supreme Military Council to support his leadership, during the fragile transition period.
Gowon, however, said he never believed Ojukwu’s opposition was entirely about military seniority or institutional principles.
According to him, “Ojukwu failed to understand the level of suspicion and hostility that existed against him among northern officers following the January 1966 coup.
“Left unsaid at the time was Ojukwu’s strong view that I was junior to him in the hierarchy.
“He failed to appreciate that he had been under serious threat because the young Northern officers believed he was complicit in the January 15, 1966 coup,” Gowon wrote.
The former military ruler disclosed that he personally intervened to prevent any move against Ojukwu despite mounting pressure.
“I pre-empted any attempt to move against him, in part, because of my respect for all the Regional Governors and, more importantly, because I saw him primarily as a colleague and officer with whom I thought I had worked to restore normalcy in those early days of uncertainty,” he added.
Gowon said he genuinely believed both men could work together to stabilise Nigeria and rebuild the Army after the political turmoil.
“I believed that, together, we could rebuild the army and allow the country to continue its course in history,” he wrote.
Despite his reservations and the suspicions surrounding Ojukwu, Gowon said he retained him as Governor of the Eastern Region, in what he described as an altruistic decision.
“My decision to retain Ojukwu in office was altogether altruistic, though subsequent events made it seem a huge mistake.
“But with the situation at hand, it did not matter whether he agreed or not with the fact that change had occurred.
“Even if he did not agree with my new role, the soldier in him never said he would leave the Army. I let him be,” Gowon wrote.
The relationship between both men later deteriorated further amid escalating ethnic tensions and the killing of several Igbo in Northern Nigeria following the January 1966 coup.
In May 1967, Ojukwu declared the secession of Biafra from Nigeria, which triggered a brutal civil war that lasted 30 months.
The war eventually ended in January 1970 after Biafra surrendered to the Federal Military Government.
